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1 Summary
The overwhelming majority of labor unions in Japan are enterprise
unions. There have been two contrasting views on the Japanese
enterprise unions. Some praises them as the most advanced
organization ofworkers' representatives. They share information with
the management and make efforts to present important interests of
employees. As "skill" of employees is enterprise-specific, labor
turnover is disadvantageous to employees. They prefer to remain in
the same firm. Enterprise union as representative of employees
defend interests of employees by participating in all important
management decisions. Company interests and employees interests
are compatible under enterprise unions. (e.g. Koike 1977)
Critical social scientists evaluate enterprise unions as too weak to
present employees' interests. Because enterprise unions are in-
company organization, social standard of working conditions is
difficult to be realized. (e.g. Hyodo 1981)
This paper aims to give concrete information on labor unions in
Japan and examines what they are. I take the car industry as an
example, because it is one of the main industries in Japan and labor
unions of the car industry are becoming more and more influential
in the Japanese labor movement.
There is a confederation of labor unions in the car industry named
Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Unions (JAW). There
are three levels of the union organization in the automobile industry.
At the industrial level there is JAW. At the enterprise level there are
enterprise unions. Between the industrial and the enterprise levels
there are federations of enterprise unions within each enterprise
group such as Toyota group or Nissan group. Therefore, I have to
examine philosophy, structure and activities at three levels of
organization.
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This paper is summarized as follows:
(1) So-called "industrial union" in the Japanese automobile industry
(JAW) is quite different from industrial unions in Europe. JAW is a
confederation of enterprise unions. The union officers of JAW are
elected by the general meeting nominally, but with nomination by
each enterprise group union in practice. JAW has no right to
negotiate with employers' associations or individual company. It is
the enterprise union that negotiate with individual company. There
is no negotiation at the industrial level, at the regional level, or at
the enterprise group level.
(2) There are two main activities of JAW. First, it coordinates
interests of enterprise group unions for better working conditions
(especially wage and working hours). Before negotiations on wage
increase or reduction of working hours at the company level, JAW
decides the common demands which each enterprise union should
present to the company. JAW encourages enterprise unions to
achieve the common demands. It is up to individual enterprise union
if it can really achieve the demands or to what extent. Second, JAW
presents and suggests industrial policies of the automobile industry
to the government and the association of the automobile companies.
(3) The functions of enterprise group unions are similar to those of
JAW. The main activities of enterprise group unions are to
coordinate interests of enterprise unions and to decide common goal
of working conditions within the enterprise group.
(4) Individual enterprise union negotiates with the company and
concludes collective agreements. As collective agreements are
concluded at each company level, it is difficult to realize social
stadardization of working conditions. Enterprise union are "amateur"
unions. Full-time officers rotate frequently. Only employees of an
enterprise can be elected as union officers of the enterprise union.
During service as full-time officers they have still status as employees.
The balance of power between the company and the enterprise
union is settled strongly in favor of the company.
(5) In 1990 JAW published new industrial policies, which were
considerbly different from the industrial policies in the 1980s. The
new policies are oriented toward structural change of the Japanese
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automobile industry. JAW proposes longer model change cycle,
reduction of number of car models and types, reexamination of
relationship between car makers and supplIers and between car
makers and dealers, reduction of working hours and so on. The
automobile industry is the real problem of the trade conflict with
other industrial countries. The Japanese automobile industry is not
only criticized by the foreign countries but will be isolated even in
Japan. Younger workers leave the automobile industry. The car
makers themselves realize that the industry has to be changed. There
is common understanding between the car makers and JAW. It is
suspected that JAW began to propose new industrial policies when
the car makers realize the critical situation of the industry.
2 Organization
There are many suppliers to car companies. Not a small number of
enterprise unions of major suppliers are organized by other
"industrial unions" such as Japanese Federation of Metal Industry
Unions or Japanese Federation of Rubber Workers' Unions. In JAW
enterprise unions of suppliers are members of Federation of Japan
Auto Parts Workers' Unions (when suppliers are independent) or
members of an enterprise group unions such as Federation of All
Toyota Workers' Unions.
In this paper I take an enterprise union of a big car maker as an
example. This company is named Yamato Motor Corporation (YMC)
anonymously. The enterprise union of YMC is called Yamato Motor
Workers' Union (YWU), and the enterprise group union within the
Yamato group is named Federation of All Yamato Workers' Unions
(AYWU).
2.1 JAW
Annual general meeting is the highest organ of JAW. It elects
officers, decides all important activities of JAW. Delegates to the
annual general meeting are elected by enterprise group unions such
as Federation of All Toyota Workers' Union. How many delegates
each enterprise group union can send depends on the number of
union members of the enterprise group union. How enterprise group
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union elects delegates can be determined by individual enterprise
group union.
Officers are composed of one chairperson (full-time), 5 vice-
chairpersons (all part-time), one general secretary (full-time), 3
assistant general secretaries (all full-time), 18 executive committee
members (all part-time), 20 administrative members (all full-time), 5
special executive members (dispatched to upper organization such as
"Rengo"), and 2 auditors (all part-time). Daily administration is
carried out by full-time officers.
Nominally the annual general meeting can elect officers. In practice,
officers are determined by negotiations between enterprise group
unions. Annual general meeting confirms the decision merely. At
present, Federation of AIl Toyota Workers' Unions and Federation
of AIl Nissan Workers' Unions send 4 full-time officers respectively
and the other enterprise group unions send one full-time officers
respectively.
JAW has no wage table for full-time officers. JAW pay only three
million Yen to each full-time officer annually. Each enterprise group
union has to pay the rest amount of wage of the officers whom it
sends out. The wage of each full-time officer is the wage amount
which he (there are no women as full-time officers) could get if he
worked as an employee in the company.
Full-time officers are of course officers of JAW and has to act taking
the whole interests of JAW. However, they are always conscious of
being sent from the enterprise group union or from the enterprise
union. The fact that the large part of their wage is paid by the
enterprise group union or enterprise union shows clearly that they
are representatives of the enterprise group union concerned.
Between a full-time officer and his enterprise group union there is
formal and informal communication. He can get confidential
information from his enterprise group union and his enterprise union
by informal route. But he can get only formal information from the
other enterprise group unions and enterprise unions.
Most full-time officers quit in two or four years. There are a few
members who remain as full-time officers for long years. Even if they
remain as full-time officers for long years, they are regarded as
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representatives of the enterprise group union concerned. As stated
later, most full-time officers of enterprise group unions and
enterprise unions also quit in two or four years, JAW as a whole is
an "amateur" union.
JAW employs 6 secretaries. They are all women and give auxiliary
service. There are no staff employed by JAW for planning and
research activities. Full-time officers are responsible for planning and
research.
2.2 AYWU
2.2.1 Members
AYWU is a federation of enterprise unions within Yamato group. As
well known, parts suppliers are organized pyramidal. Suppliers at the
first level are big companies usually. Suppliers at the second level are
smaller in number of employees and capital than suppliers at the first
level. In case of YMC, it is estimated that there are ca. 170 suppliers
at the first level, ca. 4,700 at the second level, and ca. 31,600 at the
third level. It is impossible to organize all or large part of enterprise
unions of suppliers.
According to the statute of AYWU, "AYWU organizes enterprise
unions that agree with the program and the statute of AYWU in
YMC group from production to sales." In 1991 AYWU organizes 244
enterprise unions. Of 244 enterprise unions 156 are sales dealer
unions, 8 manufacturer unions (body and final assembly), 64 supplier
unions, 9 equipment controller unions, 4 transporter unions, 3 other
unions (enterprise unions of Yamato Co-op, driving schools). About
20% of 64 supplier unions are enterprise unions of suppliers at the
second level. But the suppliers at the second level of which
enterprise unions are members of AYWU sometimes deliver parts
directly to YMC and therefore they are not suppliers at the second
level in a strict sense.
AYWU does not organize all important suppliers at the first level.
When JAW was established in 1972, JAW thought that it would cost
money and time when JAW had direct contact to individual
enterprise unions. Enterprise unions should be grouped into
enterprise group union, and JAW will contact to enterprise group
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unions. This was the reason why enterprise group unions are
organized. When AYWU was established according to this idea in
1972, some big enterprise unions of suppliers in YMC group were
already members of other "industrial unions". AYWU did not call for
these enterprise unions to come to AYWU.
2.2.2 Union Officers
AYWU has 66 union officers. Additionally AYWU has 26 staff
members mainly as auxiliary work force. Of 66 officers 11 officers are
dispatched to JAW and other upper organization. 55 officers are
responsible for planning and administration of AYWU
Among 55 officers, 34 are full-time officers and 21 are part-time
officers. Like JAW, AYWU has no wage table for full-time officers.
The wage of full-time officers are paid by the enterprise union from
which they are dispatched. It means that only "rich" enterprise unions
send full-time officers to AYWU.
The core enterprise union in AYWU is of course YWU, which
dispatches 10 full-time officers and 17 staff members to AYWU. The
chairperson, the general secretary, the assistant general secretary
come from YWU.
All in all, officers of JAW and AYWU are nominally elected by
annual general meeting concerned. In practice, however, they are
dispatched by enterprise unions. Of course JAWor AYWU can say
something who should be union officers of JAWor AYWU, it is
enterprise unions that determines finally who are dispatched to JAW
or AYWU. The fact that wage of full-time officers is paid by
enterprise unions concerned show clearly that JAW and AYWU are
federation of independent enterprise unions.
Like JAW, AYWU cannot negotiate with employers' association on
working conditions. As usual in the Japanese labor union movement,
enterprise unions negotiate with companies in the spring and in the
autumn. Before enterprise unions present demands to companies,
AYWU talks with employers' association of suppliers and of sales
dealers in Yamato group. It is a talk , not negotiation. Only
enterprise unions can negotiate with companies.
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2.3 YWU
Enterprise unions are independent and totally self-managed unions.
They can elect union officers, settle union program and statute,
choose upper organization, and negotiate with the company on
working conditions.
2.3.1 Membership
There are several types of employees in YMC as usual in Japanese
big companies:
Regular employees: Usually they are employed on April 1 every year
immediately after they graduate schools (Japanese schools end in
March). They are expected to stay in YMC until the compulsory
retirement age of 60 years old if they are male.
Temporary workers: They are employed usually for 6 months. Until
1970s most of them were farmers, who had little chance to get money
during the winter. They came to the automobile industry after
harvest of rice and returned to rice field in the spring. During work
as temporary workers they lodged in company dormitories. Most of
them were old or middle-aged. Though this type of temporary
workers can be found now, in the 1980s a different type of
temporary workers appeared. They are young and do not want to
have any definite job. They work as temporary workers for several
months, and when they think they have saved enough money, they
do not come to factory. The number of this type increased during the
"bubble boom" (1986-90). Under the very tight labor market the
management recommended them to be promoted to regular
employees, most of them refused and preferred being temporary
workers.
Part-timers: Usually their working hours are shorter than those of
regular employees. In some case, however, they work full-time. The
definition of part-timers is very difficult. The most exact definition is
as follows: Part-timers are those who are employed as part-timers.
There is clear difference of wage and welfare between part-timers
and regular employees.
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"Skilled partners": The compulsory retirement age is 60 years old. As
the labor market fell into severe labor shortage in the latter half of
1980s, car makers began to introduce reemployment system in the
1990s. YMC has introduced this system since September 1991. After
having reached 60 years old, employers applies for "skilled partners".
The management examines their career and determines if they are
suitable for "skilled partners". The contract is for one year and can
be extended until they reach 65 years old. They will work during the
daytime without overtime. They can choose part-time (4 hours a day)
or full-time (8 hours). The main purpose of this system is to fulfill
labor shortage in production area. This system does not work at
present, because when employees reach 60 years old, they retire at
the end of March. How many employees are really reemployed is not
known at present. Reportedly, however, among 400 retired
employees in YMC only 13 employees applied at the beginning of
January 1992 ("Nihon Kogyo Shinbun" of January 16, 1992). The
situation of other car makers who have introduced reemployment
system is similar to YMC It is interpreted that work in car makers
is so hard that production workers are reluctant to work moreover.
Employees of subcontractors in factories of YMC: Regular
employees, temporary workers, part-timers, and "skilled partners"
have employment contract with YMC In the cite of YMC factories,
there are workers of subcontractors. YMC contract with
subcontractors and the subcontractors employ workers. These
workers are not employees of YMC
Among these types of employees, only regular employees are
members of YMC When they are employed by YMC, they become
union members automatically regardless if they are production
workers or white collar workers. There is only one enterprise union
in YMC
The managerial hierarchy in YMC has become complicated since
YMC introduced new personnel system in the area of clerks and
engineers in 1989. Before 1989 the managerial hierarchy was simple.
According to the collective agreement between YMC and YWU,
employees who are promoted to middle managers with "qualification
Kacho rank 2" and upwards lose membership of YWU. Until 1956
middle managers "Kacho" were members of YWU. YMC demanded
YWU that "Kacho" should be non-unionized. 10 years after the war,
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YWU was under leadership of the left. By orgamzmg middle
managers, YWU could interrupt managerial directions. That the
middle managers became non-unionized told that leadership of the
left ended.
2.3.2 Union Officers
All members of the executive committee (56 persons) are full-time
officers and the other officers are part-time officers. Though there
is a branch in each plant, branch organization plays no important
role in union activities. The power is concentrated on the executive
committee. It is mainly because all manufacturing plants are located
in a narrow area and YMC is strongly managed by the headquarters.
In 1991 the Committee on Reexamining Organization recommended
that the power ofbranch should be strengthened. The committee
argued that the distance between the executive committee and rank
and file members is long because branch is powerless. Rank and file
members have little chance to appeal their opinions to the executive
committee. It makes rank and file members indifferent to union
activities.
Full-time officers are elected by union members. All union members
can stand as candidates. Full-time officers for important positions (a
chairperson, four vice-chairpersons, one general secretary, 9
department chiefs, 20 full-time officers who are dispatched to upper
organization such as AYWU or JAW)) are elected directly by all
union members. The other full-time officers are elected in each
branch. After elected, they need sanction of the second highest
legislative organ ("council").
There are two types of candidates: candidates recommended by
YWU and self-recommended candidates. The self-recommended
candidate for important positions requires at least 50 supporters
whose names are published in election newspaper. The self-
recommended candidate for the other positions requires at least 15
supporters.
Until 1971 self-recommended candidates did not require 50 or 15
supporters. In the election in 1971, a communist employee stood as
self-recommended candidate for chairperson and got 21% of all
votes. They criticized YWU as too cooperative to the company and
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ignoring workers' interests. Surprised by this result, YWU decided to
revise the election rule. As the supporters of self-recommended
candidates have to expect that they will be discriminated by both the
company and the union, union members are reluctant to become
supporters (Oki 1986). In the election in 1988 there were 7 self-
recommended candidates. They got 3.7 - 5.2% of all votes.
The communist group can be ignored neither by the company nor
the union. First, union members are under strong pressure from the
company and the union not to vote for the communist group. In
spite of these strong pressure, a part of employees vote for the
communist group. The votes for them indicate dissatisfaction of
employees against the company and the union. The company and the
union are very sensitive to the election results. Second, there are
several communists in the local assembly of the city in which most
plants of YMC locate. They have close contact with self-
recommended candidates group and often speak of the working
conditions of YMC in the local assembly as being unbearable to
workers. Third, annual wage increase is negotiated in every spring in
YMC as usual in Japan. During negotiations between YMC and
YWU, the self-recommended candidates group cooperate with left
unions in the region. They gather at the gates of the headquarters
and other plants and propagate their policies. They deliver pamphlets
criticizing YMC and YWU to citizens. This action is 'named "Action
against YMC". (Aichi Institute of Labor Relations 1990)
The self-recommended candidates group regards the stop of Saturday
and Sunday work in 1987 as the biggest result of their activities. In
1987 YMC with approval of YWU decided to work on Saturday and
Sunday in July and August. Instead, Monday and Tuesday were
holidays. In Japan, electricity bill on Saturday and Sunday is cheaper
than that on week days. Reportedly YMC could save 500 million
Yen by working on Saturday and Sunday. But this change of holidays
brought total confusion of daily life in the region. All suppliers had
to work on Saturday and Sunday too because of Just-in-Time
delivery. As in some other car makers holidays were Saturday and
Sunday, suppliers could not take holidays in that summer. School and
local events are usually scheduled on Saturday and Sunday. They had
to be canceled because fathers could not attend. It was this group
that criticized the weekend work at first. YMC abandoned weekend
work in the next year. Though it is difficult say that how much this
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group contributed to stop weekend work, their activities make YMC
and YWU sensitive.
The selection process of candidates recommended by YWU is as
follows: There are very influential supervisors in plants. They are
often called "gods in manufacturing". They become members of an
informal committee on selection of candidates. This committee has
a guideline for selecting, according to which union officer rank
should correspond to his managerial position. YWU accepts the
proposal from the committee almost automatically.
It is very difficult for nominated candidates to refuse the nomination.
When a full-time officer retires from union activities and returns to
company's work depends on decision of the committee. Usually they
serve two or four years as full-time officers and retire. There are only
few officers who wish to serve as full-time officers for long years. As
a top officer once said, "no one gets job in YMC in order to be a
union officer." With frequent rotation of full-time officers, YWU is
an "amateur" union.
There is no wage table for full-time officers. Their wage amount is
the same as that they could get when they continued their job in the
company. As well known, overtime allowance is indispensable part of
earning for workers. If the average overtime of all employees in a
month is 20 hours, full-time officers are paid overtime allowance of
20 hours.
YWU is active among production workers. Clerks and engineers are
not involved in union activities strongly. They are promoted to
"Kacho" and lose membership when they become about 40 years old.
They are much more interested in management. Almost all
production workers remain as union members. It is the policy of the
committee to occupy about one third of the full-time officers from
clerks and engineers.
3 Union Doctrines
Union doctrines of JAW, AYWU, and YWU are summarized in
Table 1. The basic tone is the same between JAW, AYWU, and
YWU: Mutual trust and understanding between labor and
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management, solidarity among workers, improvement economic,
social and political status of workers, exclusion of intervention from
outside. Except "exclusion of intervention from outside", there is no
special philosophy compared to labor unions in other industrial
countries.
JAW, AYWU, and YWU state in their programs clearly that any
kind of intervention from outside should be excluded. It means in
practice that they fight against Japan Communist Party (JCPt
In the history of the Japanese labor movement, relationship of labor
unions with political parties played a decisive role in splitting and
uniting the movement. There are three political parties that have
relationship with labor union movement: Japan Communist Party,
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and Japan Democratic Socialist Party
(JDSP). JDPS was established in 1960 by an influential politician who
accused Japan Socialist Party as leftist.
YWU, AYWU, and JAW is one of main supporters of Japan
Democratic Socialist Party (Minshato). They give financial support
to JDPS and mobilizes union members for political elections. The
political motto of JAW, AYWU, and YWU is "non-Conservative
Party (Liberal Democratic Party), anti-Japan Communist Party".
They denounce JCP as destroyer of companies. According to their
philosophy, the management and the enterprise union should
cooperate in making pie larger. After that they negotiate on its
distribution. They say, Japan Communist Party is class struggle
oriented and denies cooperation in production. Japan Communist
Party criticizes them that they are totally dependent on companies
and they do not defend workers' interests. The antagonism between
is so strong that compromise will not be possible in the foreseeable
future.
4 Union Activities
lIn Japan, Communist Party is legal. In the election of House of
Representatives in 1990 JCP obtained 16 seats in all 512 seats. JCP tries to
establish branch in enterprises. It is estimated that there are branches of JCP
in almost all car makers.
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4.1 Fields of Activities of JAW
According to a pamphlet of JAW, there are six fields of activities:
(1) Promoting industrial policies to make the automobile industry
attractive. At present the industrial policies are the most important
activities of JAW. They are discussed later in this paper.
(2) Realizing comfortable life by improving total working life. JAW
aims higher wage, shorter working hours, higher welfare benefits of
the JAW cooperative.
(3) Strengthening and enlarging JAW as "industrial organization".
JAW has about 750,000 members. JAW tries to recruit new
enterprise unions and have one million members. JAW organizes
educational schools for union officers, cultural activities and sports
events.
(4) Promoting political activities. JAW is active in political elections.
JAW decides "family candidates" (union members of JAW) and
"friendly candidates" (candidates of other unions which have good
contact with JAW) at every political election. In 1991 JAW has 8
"family members" of National Assemblies and 144 "family members"
of local assemblies. JAW has contact committee with these members.
(5) Promoting activities for national solidarity. JAW is the biggest
"industrial union" in the private sector. JAW is one of the most
influential "industrial union" in "Rengo", the biggest national center
of labor unions in Japan.
(6) Promoting activities for international solidarity. JAW has contact
with major foreign industrial unions related to the automobile
industry.
4.2 Fields of Activities of AYWU
The activities fields of AYWU are same as those of JAW. In
practice, however, AYWU has unique point of view. It is summarized
in a word "Yamato is one". In this word the two basic ideas are
expressed:
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First, differences of working conditions in Yamato group should not
be large. There are clear differences of company performance and
company size in AYWU. It is not possible to realize the same
working conditions in Yamato group. AYWU wants to limit the
range of difference.
Second, enterprises in Yamato group should clear mlillmum
conditions. In 1990 the minimum conditions were as follows: (1)
Annual scheduled working hours 2,000 hours. (2) Paid holidays for
workers with 2 years length of service 10 days. (3) Overtime
allowance 30%. (4) Mid-night work allowance 30%. (5) holiday work
allowance 35%. (6) shift work allowance 25%. (7) Compulsory
retirement age 60 years old. (8) Accident compensation 12 million
Yen. (9) Compensation to accident during commuting 5 million Yen.
(10) sick leave 24 months. When an enterprise in Yamato group does
not clear these minimum conditions, AYWU encourages the
enterprise union to clear the conditions.
As pointed out repeatedly, neither JAW nor AYWU can negotiate
with employers. What kind of role do they play in realizing goals?
Let's take annual wage increase as an example. In January of 1991
the Central Committee of JAW decided to demand 8% wage
increase. Then all enterprise group unions decided to demand 8%
wage increase. In AYWU, however, the wage level in sales dealers
is lower than that in manufacturing companies. AYWU
recommended to enterprise unions of sales dealers to demand over
8% wage increase.
All manufacturing and suppliers enterprise unions in AYWU
including YWU presented a demand of 8% and the enterprise
unions of dealers over 8% wage increase to each enterprise. They
requested companies to reply on April 3. Until April 3 enterprise
unions negotiated with companies individually. In these negotiations,
however, they did not negotiate about concrete wage increase rate.
Enterprise unions explained why they demanded 8% increase.
Companies appealed that company performance was not so high to
accept 8% increase. In the discussion enterprise unions "felt" how
much the company would reply. Companies "estimated" how much
the enterprise union really demanded. After several talks the
company replied the concrete wage increase rate.
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It is the policy of AYWU to accept the replies without strikes and
further negotiations. This practice is named "single reply". The
"negotiations" between each enterprise union and the management
are not negotiations in European sense. It is possible where informal
consent between the management and the union exists.
AYWU encourages enterprise unions by comparing enterprise unions
of the similar rank. "It is very likely that Company X will accept 5.5%
wage increase. You have to negotiate tough until your company
accepts the same percentage." This is typical manner of AYWU
during the negotiations.
On reduction of working hours, the role of JAW and AYWU are
very similar as in those on wage increase. JAW decides the demand.
AYWU decides the same demand. Each enterprise union presents
common demand to company concerned. Negotiations are conducted
in each company and the result varies.
It is very difficult to evaluate exactly how strong influence the
Japanese labor unions. Historically considered, there has been no hot
discussion on "wage inflation" in Japan except immediately after the
first oil crisis. With the first oil crisis in 1973 the consumer price
jumped suddenly. Embarrassed by the sudden jump of consumer
price, employers accepted 33% wage increase in private big
companies in the spring of 1974. Japan Federation of Employers'
Associations (JFEA, "Nikkeiren") accused big companies and decided
that wage increase should be within productivity increase. Otherwise
it will bring wage inflation. The wage negotiations in 1975 ended as
JFEA had planned. Since 1975 no one has denounced labor unions
as cause of inflation.
5 Industrial Policies
5.1 New Industrial Policies of JAW
Since 1990 JAW began to advocate new industrial policies. Until the
end of 1980s, the industrial policies of JAW had not been paid public
attention. JAW thought that growth of the Japanese automobile
industry was unconditionally desirable and they were proud of the
Japanese automobile industry as being Number One in the world.
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The crisis consciousness of JAW was very weak. For example, JAW
pointed out the tasks of the automobile industry in 1986 as follows:
(1) Balance between competition and cooperation among car makers
in the domestic and the world market.
(2) Steady utilization of technological innovations in product and
production engineering.
(3) Corresponding to the aging society. Utilization of human
resources of older people.
(4) Reasonable multinationalization of automobile companies.
(5) Increasing of peripheral work force such as temporary workers,
part-timers, and dispatched workers will change the traditional
personnel management practice.
(6) Improvement of management and engineering capability of body
assemblers.
(7) Development of original technologies of parts-suppliers.
Promotion of modernization and rationalization of equipments in
suppliers. Cautious consideration on multinationalization of suppliers.
(8) Fair competition among sales dealers. Present excessive
competition deteriorates company performance and waste human
resources.
(9) Rationalization of logistics. Working conditions of transportation
companies are bad.
However, JAW changed the tone suddenly in 1990. The new
industrial policies can be summarized as follows:
JAW is proud that the production volume of the Japanese
automobile industrj has been number one in the world since 1980.
It is achieved by enthusiasm of Japanese workers. However, this
performance has accompanied negative problems.
(1) Exhausted workers. The production volume increased from 7,8
million in 1985 to 9,9 million in 1990 mainly by increasing domestic
demand. The automobile industry could not invest in capacity-
increasing equipments in the right timing. Furthermore, the
automobile industry could not recruit enough regular workers under
the tight labor market in the "bubble boom". This situation compelled
the automobile industry to make overtime longer and to hire more
temporary workers. Additional to long working hours, regular
workers have to take care of temporary workers. They are exhausted.
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It is not desirable to hire temporary workers excessively, because skill
formation of workers will be disturbed. The labor shortage is more
severe in parts-suppliers. Car makers and suppliers worry about
loyalty of newly recruited workers2•
(2) Low profit. In the "bubble boom" the production volume
increased rapidly. And the number of models and types increased
too. As a result of increased number of models and types, investment
in R&D increased and merit of mass production reduced. The ratio
of operating profit to sales in 12 car makers (including car makers of
commercial vehicle) reduced from 3.3% in 1985 to 2.6% in 1990.
Suppliers and sales dealers are burdened with low profit too.
(3) Bashing from abroad. Foreign countries criticize the Japanese
automobile industry as too aggressive. So far as the Japanese car
makers continue to export at he present level, conflicts with foreign
countries will reach a point where a free trade system is replaced
with block economy. More serious is that even in Japan some
influential people begin to say that the trade dispute is the
automobile dispute after all. They insist that the government should
prefer the national interests to the interests of the automobile
industry. There is a possibility that the Japanese automobile industry
will be isolated not only in the international society but also in Japan.
The first action principle of the Japanese automobile industry is to
increase production volume for enlarging market share and for
recovering fixed costs. The high fixed cost is caused by too often
model change, too many models and types, too many varieties of
parts, excessive standard of quality, and so on.
2In the spring of 1991 the car makers could recruit enough number of
engineers and clerks. But they could not employ the required number of
production workers (98% of the planned number). Suppliers could neither
enough engineers nor enough production workers (84% of the planned
number of engineers, and 80% of the planned number of production
workers). Furthermore, according to data of a big enterprise group union,
95.5% of the newly employed clerks and 96% of the newly recruited
engineers remained in the same company after one year. But only 81.5% of
the newly employed production workers remained in the same company.
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The trilemma (exhausted workers, low profit rate, bashing from
abroad) is the inevitable result from the traditional philosophy. In
order to escape from the trilemma, the industry needs new
philosophy. New philosophy of the industry should contain the
following two ideas.
(1) Correction of excessive competition. The traditional behavioral
principle "production volume first" should be replaced with "fair value
added". Value added should be distributed to labor value and
ecological technology.
(2) "Coexistence" has become the key word. First, the automobile
industry should coexist with the world. Car makers should not export
.excessive competition. Car makers have already established
transplants in foreign countries. From now they should transfer the
technology which foreign countries want. Second, the automobile
industry should coexist with consumers. Car makers should develop
ecological and safe cars. Instead of immediate delivery of cars which
could be achieved by long overtime in factories, car makers publish
exact information how long consumers will have to wait for delivery.
Third, the automobile industry should coexist with employees. Until
now "company" has been the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the
life of employees. Employees have been loyal to the company. They
have obeyed to all what the company orders. The relationship
between the company and the employees have been not equal.
Coexistence of the company with the employees means that the
employees should not be dependent on the company and should be
equal. Self-realization of the employees and sound development of
the company should parallel go with.
In the concrete, the automobile industry should promote the
following policies:
(1) Policies of the automobile industry as a whole
1 Modernization of the industrial structure
1.1 Reexamination of division of labor between car makers,
suppliers, dealers, and transporters.
1.2 Correction of unreasonable trade practice between car
makers, suppliers, dealers, and transporters. Reevaluation
on merits and demerits of "Keiretsu".
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1.3 Promotion of cooperation among supplies or among
dealers.
1.4 Correction of unreasonable sales practice of dealers with
understanding of consumers.
2. Development of technology for ecology and drivers safety.
2.1 Standardization of marking of recycled parts.
2.2 Payment in advance for costs of scrapping.
2.3 Cooperative development of emission control technology.
2.4 International transfer of technology of emission control,
recycling, and scrapping.
3 Informing on the automobile industry to consumers (e.g.
how long they will have to wait until delivery of cars).
(2) Policies of individual car maker.
1 Fair evaluation on labor value. Correction of distribution of
value added.
2 Longer model change cycle.
3 Smaller number of models and types.
4 Standardization of parts.
5 Reexamination of excessive quality standard.
6 From "Production Volume First" to "Coexistence with the
World", "Reduction of working Hours First".
7 Fair profit. From "production volume oriented" to "profit
oriented".
8 Step by step reduction of overtime at final assembly line in
order to reduce actual working hours in the whole
automobile industry.
9 Correction of unreasonable demands of final assemblers to
suppliers, dealers and transporters.
10 Periodical announcement of waiting time of delivery to
consumers.
In a word, the new industrial policies of JAW are aImmg at
fundamental change of the Japanese automobile industry.
5.2 Background of New Industrial Policies of JAW
There are several social, economic reasons for JAW to shape the
new industrial policies which might lead to a structural change of the
industry.
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(1) Pressure from abroad. As well known, the Japanese government
and labor unions are trying to shorten the long working hours under
pressure from the other industrial countries. The long working hours
are regarded as unfair in the international competition. The car
industry is one of the main targets of the government for reducing
working hours. First, the car industry is the leading industry. Second,
the working hours of the car industry is longer than the average
working hours of the whole industries3• Third, the car industry is the
industry which is facing the trade dispute with the USA and EC
countries. The car makers have to reduce the working hours.
(2) Labor shortage. In the so-called ''bubble boom" since the mid
1980s the Japanese labor market has become very tight. Especially
in the '3K' industries it was difficult to recruit workers. '3K' means
'Kitanai' (dirty), 'Kitsui' (hard), and 'Kiken' (dangerous). Not only
parts suppliers but also car makers began to be regarded as '3K'
companies. Moreover, young workers once employed by car makers
left the company in a short time. For example, about one fourth
young workers who were employed as regular employees by YMC in
April 1991 left the company until the end of that year. In the 1960s
the labor turnover rate in the car makers was very high. After the
first oil crisis in 1973 it decreased. In the "bubble boom", however, it
increased rapidly. Young workers can easily find new jobs in other
industries. This situation embarrassed car makers. They had to order
overtime much because of increased production volume and
insufficient manning. It accelerated turnover further. In the Japanese
society turnover rate is often regarded as an important indication of
evaluation how good the industry or the company is. The higher the
labor turnover is, the lower the industry or the company reputation
is. It became important for the automobile industry to improve its
image.
(3) Automobile workers' opinion. In November 1989 JAW conducted
an opinion research of union members. The most noteworthy
3According to the data of RENGO, the biggest national center of
Japanese labor unions, the actual working hours of JAW was the longest
among major unions in the manufacturing industries: JAW 2,239 hours,
Federation of Electrical Machine Workers' Unions 2,169 hours, Federation of
Iron and Steel Workers' Unions 2,018 hours, Confederation of Shipbuilding
and Engineering Workers' Union 2,194 hours in 1990.
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question was, "Do you recommend your children to get job in the car
industry?" 43% workers of car makers answered "No", 52% answered
"difficult to answer", and only 4.5% answered "Yes". JAW asked
further to those who answered "No" to the question "Do you
recommend your children to get job in the car industry?" why they
do not recommend. The main answers are as follows: (1) wage is not
high enough compared to hard work 50%. (2) too much overtime
and holiday work 42%. (3) too hard work 35%. (4) personnel
management is not warm 33%. (5) anxiety about the future of the
industry or the company 30%. Car makers knew. that production
workers were already tired under too much overtime and intensive
labor. The research result of JAW accelerated to rethink the labor
situation in the industry.
(4) Declining profit. I take YMC as a typical example of the
Japanese car industry. For the past 15 years except the fiscal year
1986/87 the sales of YMC has always increased. It was 1,996 billion
Yen in 1975/75 and 8,564 billion Yen in 1990/91. The problem of
YMC is, however, the increased sales did not bring higher profit rate.
The ratio of operating profit to sales4 did not increase in the
economic boom in the latter half of 1980. The most problematic is
the sudden decline of the profit rate in 1990/91.
According to the analysis on the operating profit by YMC itself
("Nikkei Business", December 9, 1991), changing exchange rate was
the biggest negative factor in 1986-88. In 1991, however, investment
on R&D and depreciation became the biggest negative factor. If
the influence of exchange rate were not taken into consideration,
until 1990 the profit increasing factors (marketing, rationalization,
and the others) were bigger than the profit decreasing factors (R &
D and depreciation, labor and other costs, and the others). In
1990/91, however, the contribution of marketing and rationalization
decreased rapidly. The could not cover the increase of R&D and
depreciation, labor and other costs.
4 Ratio of operating profit to sales is calculated as follows:
Ratio of operating profit to sales = operating profit/sales
Operating profit =
sales - cost of sales - seIling, general and administrative expenses
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InDecember 1991 YMC said that the forecasted operating profit for
the fiscal year 1991/92 (July 1991 - June 1992) would be lower than
that for 1990/91 by 30%. Will operating profit decrease further in the
future? Investment in R&D and investment in plant and
equipments will increase, because of automation and international
competition. Labor cost' too will increase because YMC has to
reduce working hours. Can the effects of rationalization and
marketing cover the negative effects of R&D and depreciation and
labor cost? The effect of rationalization has become smaller since
1987. Does it mean that rationalization efforts according to the
traditional method has reached its limits? One thing is clear:
Increasing sales does not bring higher profit rate. The experience of
1990/91 showed the increased sales could bring absolute decrease of
profit. The situation of other automobile companies is similar to
YMC. For what the automobile companies work?
5.3 Evaluation of New Industrial Policies of JAW
In 1992 Toyota and Nissan announce that they would reduce the
number of car models and types. Further they said that the present
4-year-model-change-cycle would be reexamined. Are they positive
effects of the new industrial policies of JAW?
Until recently the industrial policies of JAW have had no appreciable
influences on the automobile industry. It can be hardly believed that
JAW has suddenly strong influences which might lead to a structural
reform of the industry.
It is important that' there is no fundamental difference of
acknowledgment of the present problems of the automobile industry
between JAW and the automobile companies. If the association of
car makers had published the same industrial policies, the car makers
would be prosecuted for an Anti-monopoly Law violence.
Furthermore, it would be very difficult for the association of the car
makers to adopt the same industrial policies, because there is clear
difference of competitiveness among car makers. When a car maker
is asked if he thinks the new industrial policies of JAW reasonable,
it is his natural response to answer, "we cannot take initiative for a
structural reform. We have to watch what Toyota will do."
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It is suspected that the car makers regard a structural reform
inevitable. JAW propagates the new industrial policies and demands
car makers for self-reform. Leading companies like Toyota or Nissan
announce new policies and other companies examines if they can
follow the leading companies.
JAW has been the partner of automobile companies. In a structural
reform in the 1990s, it is very likely that JAW is playing a role as a
partner of the automobile companies as before.
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